The First and Second Emirates of Bani Thabit in Tripolitania (A Comparative Study)

Abstract

This study examines the history of the two Emirates of Banu Thabit, which arose in the region of Tripoli of the West during the 8th and 9th centuries AH (14th and 15th centuries AD), through a comparative lens that reveals the similarities and differences between the two experiences. The research derives its significance from its endeavor to transcend traditional historical narration and delve into a deep analysis of the factors behind the emergence of each Emirate, their foundations of legitimacy, the nature of their governance systems, their defensive and economic policies, and the causes of their collapse. The central problem addressed is a pivotal question: Why did the trajectories of the two emirates diverge fundamentally, despite belonging to the same family and tribal roots? The first collapsed before a violent external shock despite its internal prosperity, while the second disintegrated due to internal conflicts and ended with a relatively peaceful liquidation and absorption by the central state. The study employs a historical methodology for data collection and criticism, a comparative methodology to analyze points of agreement and divergence in the areas of origin, governance, and foreign policy, and an analytical methodology for drawing conclusions. The study reached several key findings, most notably: The first Emirate was founded on the legitimacy of a "social contract" with the people of Tripoli and achieved an economic renaissance for a brief period, but it suffered from a gradual drift towards autocratic rule, distancing it from its social base and facilitating its rapid downfall. Conversely, the second Emirate was built on hybrid legitimacies (military force and allegiance to the Hafsid authority) and was characterized by chronic internal power struggles that invited central state intervention and led to its complete termination.

In its conclusion, the study offers an explanatory model suggesting that the cohesion of the internal front and the construction of self-generated legitimacy constitute a more decisive factor in the survival of political entities than economic prosperity or temporary external support.