Islamic Philosophy and Theology: A Comparison Between the Mu'tazila and the Ash'aris Regarding Divine Attributes"

Abstract

This study examines the issue of divine attributes in Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite thought through an analysis of the relationship between Islamic philosophy and Islamic theology (Kalām). It aims to identify the rational and theological foundations that shaped each school’s position concerning the relationship between the divine essence and its attributes. The study proceeds from the observation that the disagreement between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿarites is often reduced to the simple dichotomy of “negation and affirmation of the attributes,” whereas the actual debate involves deeper questions concerning the meaning of divine unity, the nature of an attribute, the relationship between essence and attributes, the distinction between conceptual difference and ontological difference, and the role and limits of reason in interpreting theological texts.

The study adopts a descriptive-analytical and comparative approach, supplemented by a historical approach to trace the emergence and development of the debate over divine attributes within Islamic theological thought. It relies, as far as possible, on primary sources representing the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite traditions, while also drawing upon modern academic studies for interpreting the texts and examining their philosophical dimensions. The study first addresses the concepts of Islamic philosophy and Kalām and the relationship between them, then examines the concept of divine attributes and the origins of the controversy surrounding them. It subsequently analyzes the Muʿtazilite position, which emphasizes the preservation of divine unity and rejects the affirmation of eternal attributes additional to the divine essence in a manner that would imply multiple eternal entities, and the Ashʿarite position, which affirms divine attributes while denying that such affirmation entails multiple divine essences or independent eternal entities.

The study concludes that the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿarites share fundamental theological principles, most notably belief in the existence, unity, transcendence, and perfection of God. Their disagreement therefore does not concern the principle of divine unity itself as much as it concerns how that principle should be understood and applied, as well as the meaning of an attribute and its relation to the divine essence. The study also demonstrates that reason played a significant role in the formation of both positions, while the fundamental difference lay in the rational premises adopted by each school and in the way each related unity and multiplicity, conceptual distinction and ontological distinction. Furthermore, the study shows that the issue of divine attributes constitutes an important point of intersection between Islamic philosophy and Kalām, without implying that theological positions were merely products of Greek philosophy. A distinction must therefore be maintained between demonstrable historical influence and similarities arising from the shared rational structure of the questions under discussion. The study argues that understanding the disagreement between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿarites requires moving beyond a simplified sectarian classification toward an analysis of the conceptual and argumentative structures underlying their respective positions.