The Problem of State-Building Under International Intervention: A Critical Analysis of Libya's Experience After 2011

Abstract

This study examines the problem of state-building in Libya in the context of international intervention following the 2011 uprising. It aims to analyze whether such intervention contributed to strengthening state institutions or instead deepened political and institutional fragility.

The study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach and a case study method, drawing on international documents and relevant academic literature. It is grounded in three major theoretical frameworks in international relations—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—to interpret both the motivations behind intervention and its outcomes.

The findings indicate that, despite achieving short-term military objectives, international intervention in Libya failed to support sustainable state-building. Instead, it contributed to political fragmentation, the emergence of competing authorities, the proliferation of armed groups, and the weakening of institutional capacity. Furthermore, the involvement of multiple international and regional actors with conflicting interests played a significant role in prolonging the conflict and complicating the political process.

The study concludes that the absence of a coherent post-conflict strategy represents a key factor behind the failure of state-building efforts in Libya. It recommends re-evaluating international intervention frameworks, strengthening domestic institutions, and adopting comprehensive post-conflict strategies to ensure long-term stability in fragile states.